"Identity Monarchy": Interrogating Heritage for a Divided Malaysia by Milner, Anthony
Title"Identity Monarchy": Interrogating Heritage for a DividedMalaysia
Author(s)Milner, Anthony







191Southeast Asian Studies, Vol. 1, No. 2, August 2012, pp. 191–212
©Center for Southeast Asian Studies, Kyoto University
“Identity Monarchy”:
Interrogating Heritage for a Divided Malaysia
Anthony Milner*
Malaysia, it has been observed, is currently experiencing a “revival” of “Malay 
kingship” with the growing importance of “proactive and participating constitutional 
rulers.”  In fact, modern Malaysia has since independence been characterized by 
monarchy—by a multiplicity of Rulers and elaborate royal ceremony and hierarchy 
—as well as by its “plural society.”  But the modern monarchs—though they have 
never become quite “constitutional Rulers”—cannot be seen as merely “traditional,” 
because the institution of monarchy was transformed in a fundamental way during 
the British colonial period.
Monarchy continues to be an underexamined feature of the Malaysian polity, 
and when it is discussed there is a tendency to focus on issues of power and to 
neglect its sociocultural role.  One pre-colonial dimension of monarchy that continues 
to be significant today—though in a manner less psychologically profound than 
before—is its identity-giving role.  The principal concern of this article is to deter-
mine—through a process of hermeneutic retrieval—if this role is merely relevant 
to the Malay community, or does it possess more inclusive possibilities?  Are the 
Rulers of Malaysia essentially “Malay Rulers” or has the institution a nation-building 
potential that has so far not been fully utilized?  The question is important for a 
country that many see as becoming increasingly divided.
Keywords: monarchy, identity monarchy, Malay Rulers, Malaysia, ideology, 
baseline knowledge, race paradigm, hermeneutic retrieval
In the lead-up to dramatic protests in Kuala Lumpur on the week-end of July 9–10, 2011, 
the Malaysian King, Sultan Mizan Zainal Abidin, Sultan of Terengganu, surprised some 
commentators by issuing a statement (a “Titah Khas”) that seemed to call on the Govern-
ment as well as the Opposition to step back from open confrontation.  He “urge[d] the 
government to carry out everything that is entrusted to it by the people in a just and wise 
manner. . . .”  The royal statement was a surprise for those who take for granted that the 
monarch “rarely speaks . . . and those speeches or statements are written by the govern-
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ment of the day” (Malaysian Insider, November 4, 2011).  Malaysia, it tends to be assumed, 
has an essentially “constitutional monarchy”—the Constitution (in the words of the 
standard text Politics and Government in Malaysia by Milne and Mauzy) “binds the King 
very strictly” and he must act on the “advice of the Ministers” just as the  British Queen 
has to do (1978, 243, 37).  But how confidently can we speak of a “Westminster  monarchy” 
in Malaysia?  How best can we describe the role of this monarchy?  The question is not 
merely of constitutional importance.  When we stand back to ask what characterizes 
Malaysia internationally today it is not only the country’s classically plural society. 
Monarchy—with the structure of prerogatives, ranks, ceremonies and social behavior 
that accompanies not one but nine Rulers—is also a striking feature.
Striking, yes, but modern Malaysian monarchy has received very little attention in 
studies of Malaysian politics and society—certainly in comparison with the analytic 
handling of monarchy in Thailand (Peleggi 2002; McCargo 2005; Handley 2006).  Is it 
time, it can be asked, to make greater effort to factor in Malaysian monarchy?  A recently-
published survey of the history of “Malay Kingship”—Kobkua Suwannathat-Pian’s Palace, 
Political Party and Power (2011)—presents a case for doing so, and for believing that the 
King’s July 2011 intervention is part of a larger pattern.  Kobkua, who has written previ-
ously on Thai kingship (2003), argues that there is at present a “socio-political revival” 
of “Malay kingship” (Kobkua 2011, xxii), with the growing importance of “proactive and 
participating constitutional rulers” (ibid., 391).  She writes of a royal “rejection” of the 
idea of the “Westminster-style constitutional monarch” and the call for “another type of 
constitutional monarchy”—a monarchy that is “akin to the concept and practice of the 
Southeast Asian monarchy perfected by the Ruler of Thailand since the 1970s” (ibid., 408).
Kobkua’s account, useful as it is, requires (in my view) certain qualifications.  First, 
as I have spelt out in some detail elsewhere (Milner 2011c, 14–23), there is nothing really 
new about this royal activism.  Rulers played a larger role than is often recognized in the 
process leading to Independence in 1957 (and the Independence Constitution), and have 
been active political players since that time—in certain cases attracting strong criticism 
(see, for example, Muaz 2009).  They have exercised power and influence—but my 
second qualification is that Kobkua and others have been rather too focused on issues of 
power.  The significance of monarchy—and the way that significance has changed over 
time—is of course a topic that reaches well beyond Malaysian studies, attracting cultural 
anthropologists and  historians of ideas as well as political scientists.  One lesson from 
this academic analysis is that a distinction needs to be made between royal power and 
monarchy’s socio-cultural role, and that it can be unwise to dismiss that role as something 
of merely antiquarian interest.  Another important distinction is that between the indi-
viduals who serve as monarchs and the institution itself.  Some Rulers in Malaysia are 
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more popular than  others; some have been more interventionist in the political process; 
several Sultans have been criticized for their business dealings or religious decisions 
rather than (or in addition to) their political initiatives.  My concern in this article is with 
the institution of monarchy, and the possibilities it may offer.
In Malaysia, where there is deep social division, an issue of importance is whether 
aspects of the institution’s socio-cultural role—dating back to pre-colonial history—have 
the potential to assist the building of a sense of national community.  It is well known 
that this task continues to be an urgent priority in Malaysia, and various forms of mon-
archy have had a unifying influence in other parts of the world—including, perhaps most 
notably, in Japan.  In considering such a unifying role, a critical matter—to put it suc-
cinctly—is whether Malaysians should be thinking more in terms of “monarchy” rather 
than “Malay monarchy.”  Here we confront directly the greatest ideological challenge that 
the country faces: the task of bonding such a racially-divided nation, especially with its 
sharply-defined “Malay,” “Chinese” and “Indian” communities.1)  If Malaysians are open 
to the probing of their political heritage of ideas—to engaging in a form of hermeneutic 
retrieval2) to assist in fashioning (or refashioning) institutions for the future—the question 
might be asked: must Malaysia’s “identity monarchy” serve only the Malay community, 
or are there historical grounds for believing it has the potential for a wider social reach?
Identity Monarchy
Countering Kobkua’s stress on the novelty of royal activism, I have noted (Milner 2011c) 
the observation in the 1980s from former Lord President Raja Azlan Shah that it is “a 
mistake to think that the role of a King, like that of a President, is confined to what is laid 
down by the Constitution.  His role far exceeds those constitutional provisions” (Azlan 
Shah 1986, 89).  The legal scholar, H. P. Lee reinforced the point when he explained that, 
like it or not, the “constitutional system in Malaysia” simply does not “accord with 
present-day notions of parliamentary democracy” (1995, 37).  But the references in both 
these cases, it seems to me, reach beyond issues of power and influence.  When Malay-
sia’s former senior judge, Mohd.  Salleh bin Abas, calls the King—the Yang di-Pertuan 
Agong—“a symbol of unity” (1986, 4), or we encounter the often-cited maxim “the Ruler 
1) The Institute of Malaysian and International Studies (IKMAS) at the Universiti Kebangsaan Malaysia 
is currently engaged in a project examining the history and possible future role of the race societal 
paradigm in Malaysia.  The project is also concerned to identify elements in the Malaysian historical 
heritage of ideas that might be deployed in countering the race paradigm.
2) This phrase arose in a stimulating discussion with Philip Koh.
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and Subject can never be divided,” there is a suggestion of the identity-reinforcing role 
which monarchy often played on the Peninsula and Archipelago in the pre-colonial period. 
It appears to be there too when former Prime Minister Tunku Abdul Rahman argued that 
“without the protecting influence of these Rulers the Malays would lose whatever 
semblance of belonging they might have in the land of their birth . . .” (cited in Kobkua 
2011, 264n).
Kobkua seems to allude to the socio-cultural role of monarchy—for instance, when 
she refers to “the foundation of traditional Ruler-subjects relations” having “survived . . . 
under the British residential system” (ibid., 114)—but takes the analysis little further. 
Nor does she investigate the transformation of the institution of monarchy during the 
colonial period.  Her analysis is cast mainly around matters of power.  Yet academic 
analysis over the last few decades has reminded us of the social and cultural dimensions 
of monarchy in Southeast Asia and elsewhere in the world—stressing in some cases that 
even when the Ruler himself/herself may seem weak, the royal institution can be vitally 
important in the life of the community (e.g. Geertz 1971; 1980; Milner 1982; Thongchai 
1994; Fujitani 1998; Drakard 1999; Cannadine 2001; Day 2002; Peleggi 2002; Bellah 
2003).  The Emperor of post-Meiji Restoration Japan, for instance, lived “above the 
clouds”—leaving others to exercise “real power”—but he was also understood to be the 
“axis of the state” (Bellah 2003, 34–35; Fujitani 1998, chapter 6).
In the Malaysian case, on the eve of colonial rule the sultan’s role in his state did 
not stress “the exercise of pre-eminent power” (Gullick 1965, 44; Milner 1982).  The 
character of this pre-modern kingship, as I have suggested, may have some relevance to 
modern Malaysia, but it is also important to stress the far-reaching change that has taken 
place in Malaysian monarchy over the last 200 years.  It is misleading to speak of mon-
archy today as a “traditional institution.”  Let us consider just a few dimensions of the 
kingship or kingdom that operated on the Peninsula in say, 1800.  Although in certain 
cases Rulers did give the impression of exercising considerable power, Malay writings 
in particular suggest that it was the social and what we might today call the psychological 
significance of monarchy that was fundamental.  The word that most approximated to 
“kingdom” was “kerajaan,” and it meant literally “the condition of having a raja.”  The 
Ruler was the linchpin of the community—and this would appear to have been the case 
in both the Islamic period or in the earlier, Buddhist polity (Wolters 1970, chapter 8; 
Milner 1981).  He was the head of religion in his community; custom (adat) was said to 
rest “in his hands.”  The laws of the polity were seen to “come down to us” via the ruling 
family (Milner 2002, 148).  The polity’s “historical” writings constructed the past in the 
idiom of “the raja” and his genealogical heritage.  The subject—the rakyat—seems to 
have been conceptualized almost as a part of “the Raja.”  A community without a Ruler 
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was said to be in a condition of utter confusion (huru hara).  The maxim “the Ruler and 
subject can never be divided,” it could be argued, possessed a literal truth within the old 
kerajaan ideology (Gullick 1965; Milner 1982; 2011a, chapter 3).
This observation is underlined too when we consider that the Ruler was presented 
as a Ruler—a focus of community and identity in himself—not the “Ruler of a state,” a 
territorially-defined state.  He did not describe himself in his letters, for instance, as the 
“Sultan of Perak.”  The rakyat was the subject of a Ruler not a State.  The kerajaan was 
conceptualized in terms of the personal relationship between Ruler and rakyat—not Ruler 
and a specific race—and foreigners were often surprised by how uninterested Rulers 
seemed in the physical dimensions of their “kingdom.”  In this kerajaan paradigm—for 
all its lack of stress on geographic definition—the various hierarchical relations between 
Ruler and subject were carefully defined in the position a subject took at ceremonies or 
the clothes he or she wore.  Status was determined in relation to the Ruler, and some 
court writings convey the assumption that status in this world (nama, pangkat) could 
influence one’s fortunes in the hereafter (Milner 2011a, chapter 3; Ahmat Adam 2009).
Such Rulers have been denigrated by outsiders—and by historians—for their pre-
occupation with mere ceremony (see citations in Milner 2002, chapter 1).  This observa-
tion conveys a total misunderstanding—as does the downplaying of the significance of 
ceremony in a good deal of “invention of tradition” writing (Hobsbawm and Ranger 1983). 
If we understand ceremony as the defining of the status of the subject—the marking out 
of hierarchies—then it was fundamental to the kerajaan, as important as the policing of 
territorial borders and state citizenship today.  A Ruler’s involvement in ceremony was 
in fact called his “work” (kerja), and the correct performance of ceremony (including the 
naming, addressing and positioning of a Ruler’s subjects) was a vital concern.  It is not 
surprising that the court texts of the old kingdoms often praised a Raja in terms of his 
perfect manners, his refined speech—his capacity to treat people appropriately (Drakard 
1990, 78; Milner 1982, 41).  Also, in the reported negotiations (in the “Malay Annals”) 
between a famous Ruler and his new subjects, the specific request made by the latter is 
that they should never be “reviled with evil words” (Winstedt 1938, 56–57).  This concern 
for ceremony (and language), then, is far more than theatre.  When the anthropologist, 
Clifford Geertz employed the expression “Theatre State” (1980), he was successful in 
capturing how a kerajaan-type polity could appear to an outsider.  “Theatre” is a useful 
metaphor.  But from the inside, the kerajaan was about something more earnest than 
theatre: today we might say it was about “identity.”
The concern for ceremony—for the public defining and ordering of the Ruler’s 
subjects—also had implications for economic life.  Within a kerajaan hierarchy, material 
wealth had to be aligned with status.  Sumptuary laws controlled the way people of one 
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status or another might be housed or clothed.  Wealth was conceived as flowing from the 
Ruler, as a product of patronage.  Wealth was not seen as an end in itself, but one way of 
accumulating subjects.  In this “kerajaan economics,” the accumulation of independent, 
private wealth was perceived by the royal court as a political threat, and was necessarily 
discouraged among the Ruler’s rakyat.  It is thus not surprising to find that sultans were 
often described by foreigners as the great traders in their polities, or that foreigners 
sometimes complained about the “plundering” of would-be rich subjects by the “Raja’s 
men.”  They did not understand that the aligning of status and material wealth in the 
kerajaan was a duty of the Ruler (Milner 2003b).
When we think about the kingdom or kerajaan of 1800 in these terms, it seems to 
me that it is just not tenable to assert, as Kobkua does, that “the foundation of traditional 
ruler-subjects relations” was maintained during the colonial period; or to stress, as Roger 
Kershaw has done, “the importance of continuity of the monarchy itself” (2001, 18; see 
also Roff 1994, 256; Muhammad Kamil 1998, 314).  Elements survived—and these 
deserve careful attention; but the ancien regime came under sustained attack, and the 
royal courts themselves undertook far-reaching, ideological renovation.  I have written 
in the past about this transformation of Malaysian monarchy (Milner 2003a)—and about 
the importance of acknowledging the occurrence of epistemic rupture in Malaysian and 
other history (2002)—but should emphasize here that the British brought to the Malay 
Peninsula powerful new concepts of state, government, race, progress, time and so forth. 
They endorsed a new, colonial knowledge—and this knowledge project has attracted 
scholarly interest (e.g. Hirschman 1987; Shamsul 1998; Milner 2002).  Within a few 
decades the royal courts were employing the new thinking to remodel the sultanate.  In 
Johor and Perak, for instance, they began to constitute “the state” as a specific territorial 
entity.  Surveying or mapping of territory was important in this and was described as a 
novel enterprise in court-related writings of the time.  In Johor a state constitution was 
created (in 1895), and an interesting aspect of this text is the way it translates “constitu-
tion” as “undang-undang tuboh kerajaan.”  The word “tuboh” conveys “body, in the ana-
tomical sense.”  The constitution seems therefore to be conceptualized as giving “body” 
to the kerajaan, and presumably the “State of Johor.”  In this way it becomes possible to 
think of “the state” as an entity independent of the Ruler—a truly revolutionary transition, 
at least from the perspective of the old kerajaan ideology (Milner 2002, 215–216).
In such a “state” the Ruler could no longer be constituted as the linchpin, the center 
around which all else is articulated.  The ceremonies that defined the Ruler-subject rela-
tion also had to lose some of their urgency.  In certain ways ceremonies were actually 
elaborated during the colonial period (partly under the influence of British royal practice) 
(Gullick 1987, 33, 347; 1992, 236), but they could not have the meaning they once pos-
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sessed.  It cannot be said (as Kobkua has done) that the Rulers maintained their position 
“at the very centre of all aspects of life in the state” (Kobkua 2011, 85–86).  One Malay 
author in 1925, for instance, noted that “nowadays the royal ceremonial and sumptuary 
regulations are fading” (cited in Milner 2003a, 183).  The Ruler’s “work” was to move 
into new areas: he began to be praised in new ways, judged for the contribution he made 
to his “State.”  In texts from early twentieth-century Johor and Perak, Rulers were now 
complimented for introducing “modern” institutions, for “modernizing education,” for 
“improving the lives” of their subjects, for caring for the different races in their State, 
and for helping to unite the Malay race.  They were praised for being “careful and con-
scientious” in their administration.  Such key terms or expressions as “government,” 
“modernity,” and “administrative diligence and energy”—and soon “development” and 
“progress”—began to contribute to a new royal discourse, and to challenge the dominance 
of a language concerned largely about ceremonial, custom, language, manners and status 
(Milner 2003a; 2002, chapters 8 and 9).
As represented in the new royal court writings, the Rulers of the late nineteenth 
and early twentieth century were impressive administrators and often subtle diplomats. 
They were reformers, claiming leadership of their State community (with its component 
races) in a time of challenge—a time when the Rulers had to deal with British administrative 
and ideological demands, new religious thinking from the Middle East, and increasing 
immigration numbers.  There is a suggestion here of a performance-based monarchy—
some texts from royal courts (including coronation memento albums) could now be read 
almost as election manifestos (Milner 2003a).  These new Rulers, the product of a fresh 
epistemic era, may not have had the same pivotal, ideological role in their subjects’ lives 
and mentality as their kerajaan predecessors possessed.  But in considering Kobkua’s 
claim that there is currently in Malaysia an attempt to “revive the monarch’s role”—
giving Rulers “active participation in the affairs of the nation” (Kobkua 2011, xxiii)—the 
story of the reconstruction of Malayan monarchy during the colonial period is vital.  To 
a significant extent the new “participating constitutional monarchs,” whom Kobkua 
describes as gaining support today, are the heirs of the colonial-period new Rulers at 
least as much as of the “traditional” rajas or sultans of 1800.
To use the word “traditional” in reference to Malaysian monarchs today is therefore 
misleading, but we can ask whether there are ways in which that old kerajaan ideology 
continues to be relevant to modern Malaysia?  This question touches on the issue of 
whether “colonial knowledge” is in fact the real “baseline knowledge” for modern Malay-
sia (Shamsul 1998, 49), or do some concepts from the pre-colonial era remain potent? 
The historian, Muhammad Yusoff Hashim, has suggested that the “element of spiri-
tuality” in royal sovereignty today only exists “as a belief amongst a small section” of the 
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community (1992, 281).  Few are likely now to fear the supernatural wrath of the Ruler’s 
daulat (power).  But when Tunku Abdul Rahman wrote of the “semblance of belonging” 
which the Rulers continue to give their people, then we do get a sense of the 1800 Ruler 
as linchpin, holding a defining role in his community.  We do so again, when the Raja 
Muda of Perak refers today to the unifying role of monarchy, and its capacity to provide 
a sense of historical identity and continuity (Smith 2006, 134; Kobkua 2011, 384).  I shall 
return to the issue of precisely how unifying that identity-monarchy role could be.
The influence today of the old kerajaan ideology, as has often been remarked, 
extends beyond conceptualizations of monarchy per se.  What is sometimes termed feudal 
thinking has been seen to influence attitudes to political authority in general.  Syed Hussein 
Alatas (1972), Chandra Muzaffar (1979), Shaharuddin Maaruf (1984) and Clive Kessler 
(1992)—all pioneers in this line of investigation—have examined the impact of royal 
“tradition” in shaping attitudes toward loyalty, “followership,” heroism and ceremony. 
In my own work I have been interested in the influence of old kerajaan ideas on current 
Malay approaches to entrepreneurialism, so-called money politics, top-down political 
leadership, the concept of the “plural society,” and the manner in which the idea of the 
“Malay race” (the “bangsa Melayu”) has been propagated as a focus of identity and loyalty 
(Milner 2011a, chapters 7 and 8; 2003b; see also Johnson and Milner 2005).  The continu-
ing importance of reputation (nama, and related terms) in Malay thinking seems also to 
warrant closer attention (Karim 1992, 7).
In the case of modern monarchy itself, the old kerajaan influence is to be encountered 
naturally in the continued prominence of royal titles and royal ceremonies in Malaysia—
by most international standards, this country really is marked by an elaborate monarchi-
alism—but perhaps most of all, as I have indicated, in the depicting of Rulers as a focus 
of identity and community.  While Salleh Abas has spoken of the King as “a symbol of 
unity,” the Ruler of Pahang has been described as a “symbol of the unity of the people” 
of his State (Shariff Ahmad 1983, xvii, 32).  “Symbol” (simbol) is of course a relatively 
new word, and its use here is a reminder of how far removed we are today from the 
kerajaan of 1800.  The kerajaan Ruler of that time was not conceived a “symbol”—his 
claim was to be the real basis of unity, the actual center around which all else was 
articulated.  But the claim to promote symbolic unity is still a strong one—potentially 
much more powerful, one might suggest, than the more recent heritage of the colonial-
period administrator Ruler.  The question we turn to now, however, is how comprehen-
sive is the unity which the Ruler might be expected to promote in his role as an “identity 
monarch”?  It can be argued, in my view, that the kerajaan ideology was race blind: on 
this basis it makes sense to go on to ask whether modern Malaysian monarchy has drawn 
upon—or could draw upon—that aspect of the old tradition?
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“Malay Rulers” or “Rulers”?
Time and again we encounter the words “Malay Rulers.”  Kobkua uses the expression 
herself in the title of her book.  But although she often points to the specific role of mon-
archy with respect to the Malay community—and calls the Rulers “the living symbols of 
Malay sovereignty” (2011, 393)—she does quote the present Sultan of Selangor stress-
ing that “Malaysia belongs to all Malaysians” (ibid., 387); and notes as well the insistence 
by the Raja Muda of Perak that monarchy has the capacity to give the national commu-
nity—both Malays and non-Malays—a sense of common identity (ibid., 384).  The tension 
here between “Ruler” and “Malay Ruler,” given the anxiety about national unity in mod-
ern Malaysia, should not be neglected in the discussion of the ideology of monarchy in 
this country.
In pre-colonial times, as suggested, there is a case for speaking of “Rulers,” although 
monarchy is very often assumed to be in historical terms essentially “Malay” (for example, 
Mahathir 2011, 100).  It is, in fact, in the British era that monarchy began increasingly to 
be constituted as “Malay.”  The term “Malay,” as far as I can see, was not actually used 
by the Archipelago people to describe the range of polities on Sumatra, the Peninsula and 
Borneo which were so often called “Malay” in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. 
I have argued recently that the use of the expression “Malay world” is misleading for 
the pre-colonial period, and it might be more accurate to speak of a “kerajaan world” or 
the “Archipelago sultanates”—or even the “Malay-speaking sultanates” (Milner 2011a, 
chapter 4).
As to the would-be Malayness of the rulers themselves, the Melaka royal line claims 
descent from Alexander the Great; the Sultan of Deli in Sumatra traces his genealogy 
back to an Indian who had earlier been an official in the sultanate of Aceh; and the Rulers 
of Pontianak and Perlis possess Arab origins.  Even in the clothing they wore, rulers 
displayed a flexibility regarding ethnic identification.  In the early nineteenth century, 
Johor ruler Husain dressed his sons in “Tamil fashion, wearing wide trousers and Indian 
gowns” (Abdullah 2009, 275); and Sultan Abdul Hamid of Kedah (1882–1943) “almost 
invariably wore western-style suites in preference to Malay dress,” though on ceremonial 
occasions he tended to dress in a Siamese-style uniform (Sheppard 2007, 4, 8–9).  With 
respect to high officials in the kerajaan, at the opening of the seventeenth century the 
Dutch Admiral Matelieff reported that a Peguan (from present-day Burma) was one of 
“the highest councilors” to the Ruler of Kedah (Commelin 1969, 46).  An eighteenth-
century Kedah ruler had as his “King’s merchant,” a “deep cunning villainous Chuliah,” 
who was given the title “Datoo Sri Raja” (Steuart 1901, 15, 18).  In mid-nineteenth cen-
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tury Kedah the ruler gave a noble title to a Hakka leader, who was “accorded a high place 
on State Functions” (Gullick 1992, 372–373); later in the century Kedah’s Sultan Abdul 
Hamid appointed a “well-known and much-respected Chinese businessman” as “State 
Treasurer,” with a “royal office . . . sited in an extension to the palace” (Sheppard 2007, 
4–5).  In Pahang about the same time, a “Tamil Indian” was the “treasurer and tax col-
lector” (Gullick 1965, 52), and earlier in the nineteenth century, Johor Sultan Husain had 
an influential Indian advisor called Abdul Kadir bin Ahmad Sahib, who was given the title 
“Tengku Muda” (Abdullah 2009, 275).
Subjects of rulers tended to be described just as “rakyat” rather than as members 
of races or ethnic groups.  As suggested already, the self-classification “Malay”—used to 
refer to a trans-sultanate racial unity—is a relatively modern innovation in Island South-
east Asia.  Its growing use was particularly influenced by the propagation of European 
thinking about “race” from the end of the eighteenth century (Milner 2011a, chapters 4 
and 5).  The term “Malay,” of course, had long been associated with the Melaka polity 
and the sultanates connected with Melaka, but the idea of a specific “Malay race”—a race 
with which one identifies, and to which one owes loyalty—was something that emerged 
primarily in the colonial period.  The subjects of the pre-colonial Ruler would in some 
situations identify with a geographic location, usually a river—calling themselves, for 
instance, “orang Kemaman” or “orang Muar” (and there are rivers named “Melayu” in 
Sumatra); but the larger community with which they identified was not a race but a specific 
kerajaan.  It was possible to live outside the kerajaan entity; and I have suggested else-
where that the formation of communities from China in particular—communities that 
lived separately from the Ruler’s subjects, and did not operate by kerajaan rules in their 
social and economic lives—are in a sense a precursor of the “plural society” configuration 
that was consolidated in colonial Malaya (Milner 2003b).  Despite such segmentation, 
however, the pre-colonial kerajaan itself does not appear to have been conceptualized in 
specifically racial or ethnic terms.
Even in the British period many subjects of rulers on the Peninsula continued to call 
themselves “Minangkabau,” “Bugis,” “Baweyan” or “Javanese.”  Chinese might also be 
subjects of a ruler at this time (Ratnam 1965, 72; Mohamed Suffian 1972, 207; Emerson 
1964, 509).  For instance, in a 1931 legal case involving a Chinese man (Ho Chick Kwan), 
whom the British wanted the Sultan of Selangor to banish, Ho was described as a  “natural 
born subject of the Ruler of the State of Negri Sembilan,” and his adopted mother (Lui 
Ho) described herself as owing “true allegiance to His Highness the Sultan of Selangor” 
(Ho Chick Kwan v The Hon’ble British Resident Selangor, criminal appeal no.11 of 1931).
British racializing of the Sultanates was evident even in the early nineteenth 
century, when the official British presence was limited to Penang.  Thomas Stamford 
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Raffles and John Leiden—at that time planning Britain’s future role in the Archipelago—
conceptualized the different Sultanates as members of “a general Malay league” that 
might be placed “under the protection” of a British governor (Raffles 1991, 25).  When 
the British intervened administratively in the Peninsular Sultanates, commencing with 
Perak in 1874, they identified a special Malay responsibility for the Rulers.  The new 
British advisers—or “Residents”—were to be powerful in some matters, but the areas 
of “Malay Religion and Custom” were to be left to the Rulers (Gullick 1992, 2).  British 
officials also cooperated with the Sultans in the formulation of policies specifically 
designed to benefit “The Malay Race in the FMS,” to quote the title of a memo written 
in 1906 (Burns 1971, 5).
Pronouncements from the royal courts themselves in the colonial period, it should 
be noted, continued to stress the responsibility of the Ruler toward all his subjects.  An 
early twentieth-century Johor text—the “Hikayat Johor”—lauds Johor’s Sultan Abu Bakar 
(1885–95) for “looking after the Chinese subjects living in the state.”  There is also men-
tion of Chinese and Indians welcoming him home from an overseas journey (Mohamed 
Said 1930, 59, 44).  In a later Perak coronation document, again we see a Ruler reaching 
out to non-Malays, stressing in a speech that he had “not forgotten the help” that “other 
races in the state” had given “in making Perak wealthy and prosperous.”  At the corona-
tion itself, not only Malays but also Chinese, Ceylonese, Indians and Japanese made 
formal declarations of loyalty to the new Ruler.  Sultan Abdul Aziz, so the text stresses, 
“does not distinguish between his subjects” (Milner 2002, 243–244; Lob Ahmad 1940).
In a valuable, left-wing account of British Malaya on the eve of the Japanese invasion, 
the activist Ibrahim Yaacob referred to a Kelantan Ruler bestowing a prestigious title on 
a Chinese merchant, and observed that the Johor state council building looked like a 
Chinese audience hall because it was decorated with Chinese writing.  When Ibrahim 
Yaacob asked what the writing was about, he was told that it recorded the personal ser-
vice of wealthy Chinese people to the Ruler (Milner 2002, 261).  Ibrahim was sympathetic 
neither to Rulers nor to the influx of Chinese and Indians, whom he saw as pressuring 
“the Malays” in economic and other areas (ibid., 263).  He would have known that Rulers 
could form alliances with these groups.  John Gullick, in his detailed historical research 
on the Rulers in the colonial period, has described how business activities with both 
Chinese and Europeans tended to draw Rulers into the “non-Malay, official and business 
world, which was beginning, by the 1920s if not before, to dominate Malaya” (1992, 
213–214, 131n125).  Apart from provoking Ibrahim Yaacob, this personal experience 
would have reinforced a Ruler’s sincerity in thanking these “races” for the help they gave 
to making his State “wealthy and prosperous.”
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Self-racializing
Despite such royal affirmations of inclusiveness, however, the royal courts were also 
positioning themselves in one way or another with respect to the “Malay” movement. 
The “Hikayat Johor,” mentioned above, stresses the Sultan’s special concern for his 
“subjects of the Malay race” (Milner 2003a, 179); the later Perak text indicates the Perak 
Ruler’s concern about “uniting our race (bangsa),” and about the Malays being “left 
behind” by other races in the development of the Perak state (Milner 2002, 242–243). 
There is a claim to leadership being conveyed in such statements, and it should be under-
stood in the context of a general royal wariness.  The Rulers appear to have understood 
well that those promoting the bangsa Melayu were advocating a focus of identity and 
loyalty that could compete with monarchy; race also carries an implicit egalitarianism 
that has the potential to rival the essential hierarchy of monarchy.  It is certainly the case 
that some prominent advocates of race—proponents of the “bangsa Melayu”—right back 
to Abdullah bin Abdul Kadir in the early nineteenth century, were determined critics of 
specific Rulers and even of the institution of monarchy (ibid., 15; Ibrahim Yaacob 1941, 
6, 58).
Not surprisingly the “Malay” movement met royal opposition, as Ibrahim Yaacob’s 
pre-War survey of British Malaya confirms.  Some royal courts, he said, held “firmly to 
the old feeling and strongly oppose the new desire to unify the Malay people.”  In Kedah, 
members of the ruling elite had opposed the formation of a Malay association on the 
ground that Kedah “possesses a raja”; in Perak royal opposition initially discouraged the 
use of the term “Malay” in the name of an association intended to promote unity (Milner 
2002, 269–270).  In Selangor, there was certainly a “Selangor Malay Association,” but it 
was led by a member of royalty and was utterly deferential toward the ruler (Smith 2006, 
128).  Looking to sultanates beyond the Peninsula, D. E. Brown’s study of Brunei notes 
that sultanate’s suspicion of “ethnic distinctions,” and the insistence that “all indigenous 
groups enjoyed the common status of subject of the Sultan” (Brown 1970, 4, 9).  In 
mid-twentieth-century East Sumatra it was reported that the kerajaan leadership (in such 
sultanates as Deli, Langkat and Asahan) “never cared for the suku Melayu” (the Malay 
ethnic group), fearing competition from potentially-influential “Malay” associations  (Ariffin 
1993, 78).
How best then to handle the growing Malay movement?  Discourage it, or position 
oneself in a leadership role?  It was in the immediate post-war years, in the struggle 
against the Malayan Union, that the Rulers were pressed most strongly to identify with 
the Malay movement.  At that time more than ever before, it can be argued, monarchy 
was racialized.  The Japanese Occupation had sharpened further the tension between 
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“Malays” and “Chinese” in particular, and the movement against the Malayan Union was 
perceived to be fundamentally “Malay.”  Kobkua and others have shown that the Rulers 
were far from passive in the struggle against the British (Kobkua 2011, chapter 4; Smith 
1995, chapter 3; 2006), and “Daulat Tuanku” (“Power to the Ruler”) continued to be a 
rallying cry (Stockwell 1979, 71).  But Cheah Boon Kheng (1988) and Ariffin Omar (1993) 
have demonstrated how strongly “Malayism” began to compete with monarchy in the 
process of the Malayan Union debate, and how popular the declaration “Hidup Melayu” 
(“Long Live the Malays”) became.  While some Sultans continued to take the “Malay” 
movement head on—the Kedah Ruler, for instance, was determined to “eradicate UMNO 
influence” from his State (Smith 1995, 176)—the Sultan of Pahang spoke of “we Malays,” 
and the Sultan of Perak declared that he spoke “as a Malay not as a Sultan” (Ariffin 1993, 
104).
In the period leading up to Independence, when the Rulers were determined to help 
shape the constitution for the new nation, they also took pains to advocate a range of 
Malay causes.  They spoke up on such topics as Asian immigration, Malay land reserves, 
and the protection of Malay economic interests (Kobkua 2011, 149–150, 152).  In 1951, 
during the Malayan Emergency—when the British were concerned to improve the living 
conditions for Chinese who might potentially join the terrorists—the Rulers warned that 
“it is very essential to reassure the Malays that they are not being neglected and forgot-
ten” (Smith 1995, 111, 113, 116).  In these and other ways the Rulers—in competition 
with the UMNO leadership—presented themselves (in Kobkua’s words) as “credible and 
respectable champions and guardians of the Malays” (Kobkua 2011, 183).
The 1957 Federal Constitution itself conveys the impression of allocating the Rulers 
a specific Malay role.  In Article 153 (1), the King is given the responsibility “to safeguard 
the special position” of the Malays (and “natives” of Sabah and Sarawak), and also “the 
legitimate interests of other communities. . . .”  This might appear ethnically even-handed, 
but public focus has tended to be placed on the Malay dimension—probably because the 
establishing of the Malay “special position” (with the practical benefits included) is often 
considered “the most unusual feature of the Malaysian Constitution” (Harding 2007, 120). 
Important amendments to the Constitution in 1971—following the 1969 riots—reinforced 
the impression of a privileged Ruler-Malay community linkage.  Now it was necessary 
to have the consent of the Conference of Rulers (which meets regularly and possesses 
powers outlined in the Federal Constitution) before making a change to the constitutional 
provisions relating to national language and to the “special position of the Malays”  [Article 
153 (1)] (ibid., 121–122).  It does not assist the inclusiveness of Malaysian monarchy that 
public discussion of this amendment has emphasized the Rulers’ increased responsibility 
toward Malay interests (see, for example, Malaysian Mirror, October 21, 2010); nor is it 
A. MILNER204
helpful—from the point of view of maintaining ethnic neutrality—that press statements 
on this and other matters, issued by the “Conference of Rulers,” repeatedly refer to the 
Rulers as “Malay Rulers” (Kobkua 2011, 424–426).
Under the Federal Constitution the Ruler was confirmed as “Head” of the “Muslim 
religion” in his state, and could “act in his discretion” in performing that role (Sheridan 
1961, 4, 73).  As not all Muslims in Malaya/Malaysia are Malay, however, this stipulation 
cannot be defined as essentially ethnic.
The continued racializing—the “Malayizing”—of the Rulers can be seen in many 
other areas in the post-War public discourse of Malaysia.  It takes place when Rulers are 
described as the “symbol” or “cement” assisting to hold the Malay race together (Ariffin 
1993, 53, 102); or (in the 1980s) when Salleh Abas writes of “Malay rulership” as “the 
nub of Malay custom” (1986, 13).  The racializing is happening again in current school 
history texts, which describe all the old Peninsular sultanates as “kerajaan Melayu”—
despite the fact that none of the early royal court writings use the phrase (and tend to 
use the term “Melayu” itself with reference only to Melaka and  sultanates closely linked 
with the Melaka ruling family) (Ahmad Fawzi et al. 2010, 123, 129; Malay Concordance 
Project).
In the post-Independence period we have also seen more Malayizing of monarchy 
on the part of individual Sultans.  When the Sultan of Perak spoke in 1946 “as a Malay 
not as a Sultan,” he had said too that “we are Malays and must not lose our customs and 
religious practices, which are our prized possessions” (Ariffin 1993, 104).  Customs and 
religion—which in the past, as I have noted, were presented as being “in the hands of 
the ruler” (Milner 2002, 101)—would now appear to have been recognized by the Ruler 
himself as being grounded in the “Malay race.”  The point is made with even more clarity 
in a coronation document of 1971 from the royal court of Pahang.  Here the Pahang 
monarchy’s customs and ceremonial—which once would have been of vital importance 
merely because they were royal customs and ceremonial—are presented as significant 
because they are a “branch of Malay culture” and a reflection of the “national character-
istics of the Malay people (bangsa Melayu)” (Anon 1971; see also Milner 2003a, 188–189).
Trans-racial Residue
Although the Rulers are referred to frequently as “Malay Rulers”—even, as I have said, 
in pronouncements from the Conference of Rulers—it must also be said that the residue 
of an earlier trans-racial substance has survived in post-Independence as well as colonial 
times.  Looking back half a century, we see this residue when the Rulers favoured a 
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multilingual system of school education, and not just the learning of Malay and English 
(Kobkua 2011, 216); it is there again in May 1969 when Chinese people recall that—at a 
time of acute inter-racial crisis—the Sultan of Trengganu and other Rulers took steps to 
protect their non-Malay subjects.  We see the residue in a different sphere when new 
Malay “commoner” entrepreneurs express resentment at having to compete in business 
with Rulers who act through Chinese intermediaries (ibid., 364).  There is an important 
political gesture toward the trans-racial again in a special press statement from the 
Conference of Rulers in October 2008.  Here the Rulers explain that the “institution of 
the Rulers” is a “protective umbrella ensuring impartiality among the citizens.”  The 
statement explains the Rulers’ “constitutional role” respecting the so-called “Social 
Contract” between Malays and non-Malays, and assures “non-Malays” that there is 
no need to “harbour any apprehension or worry over their genuine rights . . .” (ibid., 
425–426).
Indications of even-handedness in politics or business are one matter, but in what 
ways does the institution of monarchy itself continue to be racially-blind?  The fact that 
the Federal Constitution uses the term “Rulers” not “Malay Rulers” (though the present-
day Constitutions of the different States require Rulers to be “Malay”) (Legal Research 
Board 1998) seems significant.  It is also a positive sign when a Sultan is described by 
his supporters—in the case of Pahang—as a “symbol of the unity of the people (rakyat)” 
(and not just the Malay race, or bangsa) (Shariff Ahmad 1983, xvii, 32); or, in the case of 
Kelantan, as the “umbrella sheltering” the people (rakyat) (Mohd. Zain Saleh 1987, 14; 
also, in Perak, Nazrin Shah 2011).  The term rakyat—used again by the Sultan of Selan-
gor when he speaks of his State’s “citizens, regardless of ethnic background and faith” 
(New Straits Times, January 7,  2011)—may convey to some a memory of “feudal” times, 
but it is without doubt racially inclusive.  It is stressed in the pronouncements of the 
current Malaysian government, particularly at times when the “1Malaysia” vision is being 
spelt out (Berita Harian, December 6, 2010), and achieved enough conceptual distance 
from the hierarchy of the kerajaan to be employed in the titles of the democratic social-
ist party, the Partai Ra’ayat (People’s Party) (founded 1955) and the Opposition Parti 
Keadilan Rakyat (People’s Justice Party), established in 2003.
Here we might return to the matter of ceremony—which is also difficult to detach 
from the Raja: Rakyat binary.  In pre-colonial times ceremony—titles, sumptuary laws, 
elaborate and lengthy public ceremonies—was vital in defining the kerajaan polity and 
community, giving each person a place with respect to the royal hierarchy.  Today, 
policing on the part of the immigration and citizenship administration of the bordered 
state is critical in determining membership of the national community.  Nevertheless, as 
observed already, the Malaysian community continues to be characterized by formalized 
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hierarchy and public ritual.  Nine Rulers, an elaborate structure of Tun, Tan Sri, Dato’ 
Sri and Dato’ rankings, and vast numbers of lower awards and medals—such an array of 
titles and distinctions, combined with an immensely busy calendar of public occasions 
and celebrations at Federal and State level, all convey this strong “monarchialism.”  And 
just as the word “rakyat” conveys both hierarchy and inclusiveness, so the royal cere-
mony has a capacity to bond.
The birthday celebrations for the different Rulers are a time when we see some 
evidence of the continued trans-racial character of monarchy.  Thus, at the Sultan of 
Perak’s Celebration in April 2011 the recipients of the high honors included a leading 
businessman whose father was Goanese and a wide range of Chinese and Indian people—
from academia, the media and the arts, as well as the business community (Sagaran 2011). 
The ceremony on such occasions, so many would object, is considered today to be 
distinctly “Malay,” and thus by no means race-blind—and the fact that this objection 
is widely held, it must be admitted, has to damage the potential bonding capacity of 
monarchy.  There is confusion here, however, as the discussion in this article should 
indicate.  The argument that monarchy—the kerajaan—is a “branch of Malay culture” 
is relatively recent.  Historical analysis suggests that the kerajaan (including its cere-
mony)—with its complex combination of Islamic and pre-Islamic features—precedes the 
development of Malay ethnic consciousness, and the argument could be made that it still 
has the potential to transcend racial sentiment and identity today.
The “bonding of the nation,” as is well known, is an urgent issue in Malaysia, where 
racial or ethnic communities have often attracted more loyalty than the state itself.  Over 
the years there have been numerous attempts to counter the race paradigm—the project 
to create a “People’s Constitution” in the 1940s; Lee Kuan Yew’s advocacy of a “Malay-
sian Malaysia” in the 1960s; Mahathir’s suggestion of a single “Malaysian people,” a 
“Bangsa Malaysia”; and so forth.  The current Opposition party, Parti Keadilan Rakyat 
(People’s Justice Party) seeks to go beyond race; the Government also seems to want to 
do so when it speaks of “1Malaysia.”  One attempt after another, however, seems almost 
inevitably to become entangled in racial or communal politics.3)  Frustrated in planning 
ahead, it is not unusual to reach back for assistance from the past.  In interrogating the 
historical heritage of ideas of Malaysia, searching for concepts that might be appropriated 
in planning a more inclusive national community, the old kerajaan—the historical founda-
tion for an “identity monarchy” that would still seem to possess a degree of potency 
today—does appear to be a societal paradigm that has a claim to attention.  In the last 
century, although monarchy has become embroiled in race issues, it contains an ideo-
3) See footnote 1).
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logical residue—if we can disassemble ideology in that way—that is racially inclusive or, 
perhaps more accurately, racially blind.
Conclusion
In her recent book, Kobkua has written interestingly of a “socio-political revival” of 
“Malay kingship” but has focused most of all on the political, stressing fluctuations in royal 
power over the years.  Malaysia, it is true, is characterized in part by its monarchialism—
it has been so since Independence, and the phrases “Westminster monarchy” or “con-
stitutional monarchy” do not quite fit.  In my view, however, it is most of all the social 
and cultural construction of Malaysian monarchy that has been under-examined, and we 
need to investigate this dimension in a “history of ideas”—or a history of ideology—that 
reaches back beyond the colonial era.
As an institution the modern monarchy is fundamentally different from the kerajaan
polity of some 200 years ago, and the current Rulers are the heirs of the performance-
based administrator royals of the colonial period as much as (or more than) of the pre-
colonial “traditional” Sultans.  Nevertheless, there would seem to be advantages in exam-
ining ways in which the old kerajaan might have significance for current Malaysia.  It 
should be said at the outset that reaching back to pre-colonial times to consider the pos-
sible current relevance of the historical heritage, the importance of the kerajaan ruler 
would not appear to rest on the wielding of administrative power.  With this in mind, an 
exercise in hermeneutic retrieval is unlikely to provide much ideological justification for 
the enhancement today of royal authority in day-to-day government administration.  One 
avenue that could prove more profitable in a project of retrieval would involve a close 
examination of the way pre-colonial Rulers provided religious leadership.  This would 
seem to be a neglected field of historical investigation, and a recent visit to Morocco—
where the King’s current and historical role in the religious life of the community seems 
to be profound—encourages me to suggest the advantage of examining Malaysian his-
torical materials in a comparative context.
Considering the way current Malaysian deliberation has focused on the country’s 
deep social divisions, however, it is perhaps the identity-giving function of the pre- colonial 
ruler—as the linchpin of his community in a fundamental sense—that adds most sub-
stance to monarchy’s claim to present-day relevance.  When one prominent royal spokes-
man referred in recent times to the monarchy’s capacity to provide “social glue” (Nazrin 
Shah 2004, 6), he invoked a continuing theme in this country, reaching back to the 
earliest Malay-language records.  But do we need to think of “identity monarchy” only 
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with reference to the Malay community?  My first concern here, of course, is not with 
how individual Sultans have behaved toward one ethnic group or another but with the 
ideology of monarchy.
The final section of this article considers whether there is historical support for 
believing the unifying role of kingship has the potential to transcend ethnic division—and 
here I suspect my analysis has diverged somewhat from the current majority view. 
Malaysia’s monarchy, it can be argued, is not in historical terms an essentially “Malay” 
institution.  Its specifically “Malay” character is a product primarily of the colonial period 
and the decolonization process.  The kerajaan of pre-colonial times was not racially 
defined—and we get a hint today of this characteristic of the old institution when the 
term “rakyat” is used to describe “the people” in political rather than racial terms, and 
when ceremonies and pronouncements of the reigning Rulers continue to incorporate 
members of all ethnic groups.  Focusing on the race-blind character of the precolonial 
institution, we have the opportunity to recover something of the old royal tradition which 
might be employed on behalf of the “bonding of the nation.”  Exactly how it could be 
employed is a topic that would require a separate analysis, but in Japan, the United King-
dom and elsewhere we encounter useful case studies, and they suggest that where 
monarchy offers a nation “social glue” this does not necessarily entail a shift of personal 
power toward individual monarchs.  Given the current Malaysian government’s stress 
on identifying ideological substance that might support a “1Malaysia” vision, an attempt 
to find an effective and politically safe way to harness the kerajaan’s ideological strengths 
would seem warranted.
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